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Abstract: This study elicits individual risk preferences in the context of an infectious disease using choice 
experiments. A main objective is to examine scope sensitivity using a novel approach. Our results suggest 
that the value of a mortality risk reduction (VSL) is highly sensitive to the survey design. Our result cast 
doubt on the standard scope sensitivity tests in choice experiments, but also on the validity and reliability 
of VSL estimates based on stated-preference studies in general. This is important due to the large 
empirical literature on non-market evaluation and the elicited values’ central role in policy making. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) to guide resource allocation in environmental, health and risk 
policies that affect mortality and morbidity requires a common metric for benefits and costs. Monetary 
values act as this common metric and today there is broad consensus that the willingness to pay (WTP) 
approach to evaluate health risk reductions, which was established in the 1960s and early 1970s (Dreze 
1962, Jones-Lee 1974, Mishan 1971, Schelling 1968), is the appropriate approach to evaluate small 
changes in health risks. Since the early theoretical contributions a vast amount of empirical work has been 
conducted, evaluating a wide range of risks (Viscusi and Aldy 2003, Lindhjelm et al. 2011). Whereas there 
is consensus about the WTP approach there has been controversy regarding the empirical elicitation of 
individual WTP. 
 Since no easily available market prices exist for health risk reductions, researchers instead rely on 
either revealed- (RP) or stated-preference (SP) methods. RP methods use individuals’ actual decisions in 
markets that are related to the good of interest, whereas SP methods elicit individuals’ preferences in 
constructed and hypothetical markets using surveys. The empirical literature on monetizing health risks 
has mostly dealt with the WTP to reduce mortality risks, referred to as the value of a statistical life (VSL). 
The literature has been dominated by the hedonic pricing technique (Rosen 1974), an RP method which 
uses market data, for instance in the areas of workplace and traffic safety (Viscusi and Aldy 2003, 
Andersson and Treich 2011), and the SP method referred to as the contingent valuation method (CVM) 
(Lindhjelm et al. 2011). In recent years discrete choice experiments (DCE) have become a popular SP 
approach to evaluate health risks in health, transportation, and environmental economics (Hensher et al. 
2009, Cameron, DeShazo, and Stiffler 2010, Alberini et al. 2007, Adamowicz et al. 2011). Carson and 
Louviere (2011) defined DCE as an SP method where respondents are asked to make a discrete choice 
between two or more options in a choice set, and where the different options are varied based on an 
experimental design. The results from the DCE studies on health risk evaluation are in line with results 
from both RP and CVM studies; individuals have a positive WTP to reduce their risk exposure, WTP 
varies between contexts, and the population means of mortality and morbidity risks are similar to values 
from the other evaluation techniques. Reviews and meta-analyses of the WTP literature on mortality 
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health risk evaluation have shown that most VSL estimates fall within the range US$ 1 to 10 million 
(Dekker et al. 2011, Lindhjelm et al. 2011, Viscusi and Aldy 2003). 1 
Among economists not much controversy has surrounded the empirical application of the RP 
methods; since actual decisions are used individuals have incentives to be well informed and to make 
decisions that are in their interest. More controversy has surrounded the validity of SP approaches (CVM 
and DCE), generally based on the fact that decisions are hypothetical (see e.g. Hausman 2012). Despite 
the criticism there has been a large increase in the use of SP studies over the past few decades (Carson 
and Hanemann 2005). The advantage of the SP approach is that it offers flexibility in creating specific 
markets of interests and allows the analysts to control the decision alternatives. Advocates of SP studies 
have argued that much of the early negative findings were a result of bad survey design and that more 
recent surveys, where the methodology and knowledge among analysts have improved, provide results 
with a much stronger validity (Hammitt and Haninger 2010, Carson 2012).  
 To evaluate the validity of the WTP estimates from SP studies analysts rely to a large extent on 
scope sensitivity tests (Arrow et al. 1993, Desvousges, Mathews, and Train 2012), i.e. that WTP increases 
with the scope of the good being valued. Researchers can examine scope sensitivity using a within-
sample (“internal”) and/or between-sample (“external”/”split-sample”) test. In a within-sample test each 
respondent answers a number of valuation questions with varying scope of the good, whereas in a 
between-sample test different sub-samples value different scopes of the good. The within-sample test is 
far less demanding since by asking repeated questions (provide repeated choice sets) respondents are 
given a clue to show “internal consistency” (Charness, Gneezy, and Kuhn 2012, Fischhoff and Frederick 
1998). In the literature on WTP for health risk reductions, a distinction is also made between “weak” and 
“strong” sensitivity to scope (Corso, Hammitt, and Graham 2001). Weak scope sensitivity is fulfilled if WTP 
increases with the size of the risk reduction, while strong scope sensitivity refers to the situation where 
WTP increases near-proportionally to the magnitude of the risk reduction (Hammitt 2000). A lack of near-
                                                           
1
 Ranges and reference years for the price levels varies between studies. However, the US$ 1 to 10 million range is in 
line with the narrower range of the estimates using workplace safety data reported in Viscusi and Aldy (2003). A topic 
not addressed thoroughly in these cited reviews is whether SP studies systematically produce higher or lower 
estimates than RP studies. Reviews of the literature have come to different conclusions, though, with, e.g. de Blaeij et 
al. (2003) finding evidence that SP studies produce higher estimates than RP studies and Kochi et al. (2006) the 
opposite. 
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proportionality will result in a large variation in the estimates of the marginal WTP for the risk reduction, 
which will question the validity of the results (Hammitt 2000).The general finding in the literature is that 
WTP is sensitive to the size of the good but not in line with what theory predicts (Hammitt and Graham 
1999, Desvousges, Mathews, and Train 2012, Lindhjelm et al. 2011), i.e. “weak” scope is usually satisfied, 
whereas “strong” scope is not. 
 The CVM has been extensively evaluated using both within- and between-sample tests, whereas 
DCEs almost exclusively have been evaluated using within-sample tests. By construct, each DCE 
provides a within-sample scope sensitivity test considering that the scope of the good is varied across 
choice-sets, and significant scope is thus often described to be present if the coefficient estimate of an 
attribute (e.g. the size of the mortality risk reduction) show the expected sign and is statistically significant. 
Some authors have argued that the between-sample test does not apply to DCEs (Adamowicz et al. 
2011). In a meta-analysis of VSL estimates Lindhjelm et al. (2011) found that 291 of 318 estimates 
passed a within-sample scope test, whereas only 85 of 199 CVM estimates passed a between-sample 
scope test. The authors did not examine whether the choice of CVM or DCE affected the sensitivity to 
scope, but only CVM estimates were evaluated using the more demanding between-sample test. In the 
wider literature, Desvousges, Mathews, and Train (2012) conducted a survey of CV studies on natural 
resource damage assessment and found that 40 of 109 studies passed all scope tests, the rest showed 
mixed results or failed to show sensitivity to scope. Studies evaluating relative sensitivity to scope in CVM 
vs. DCE have also used between-sample (CVM) to within-sample (DCE) comparisons (see e.g. Foster 
and Mourato 2003). Already the NOAA panel (Arrow et al. 1993) was explicit about the fact that between-
sample scope sensitivity tests are necessary to demonstrate valid estimates from an SP study. The lack of 
evaluations of DCE studies in terms of between-sample scope sensitivity, or something of the sort, is 
therefore a fundamental missing piece in the literature.2 
Thus, in this study we extend the literature on DCEs and scope sensitivity tests by performing 
both the standard within-sample validity test, as well as a novel between-sample scope sensitivity test. 
                                                           
2
 It should be mentioned that there is a literature which investigates price vector effects in DCEs (e.g. Slothuus 
Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2003, Hanley, Adamowicz, and Wright 2005, Carlsson and Martinsson 2008) . Using 
between-sample designs these studies find that changing the range and levels of the price attribute can have an 
impact on estimates of marginal WTP. These studies do not investigate sensitivity to scope in the context of risk 
reductions, however. 
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The novelty of our approach to examining this question is that we for one subsample run a state-of-the-art 
design where we use the actual policy-relevant mortality risk-reduction levels and then for another sample 
use levels that are significantly higher, but still reasonable from the respondents’ perspective. This makes 
it possible to test for scope sensitivity both within each sub-sample (whether respondents within a sub-
sample prefer policies with larger risk reductions) and between sub-samples (whether respondents in a 
sub-sample with larger risk reductions report a higher WTP).  
We address our aim using an application of health risks related to an infectious disease caused by 
the bacteria campylobacter, i.e. campylobacteriosis. Humans are mainly infected by campylobacter 
through contaminated food or water (Taylor et al. 2012) and we will therefore elicit preferences in a market 
setting where individuals can reduce their risk by consuming safer food or water. The data are modelled 
using both standard and latent-class logit models with non-linear utility functions to allow for the estimation 
of discount rates. The latent class model allows for preference heterogeneity, which we find is substantial, 
and makes it possible to investigate differences among groups of respondents in terms of their sensitivity 
to scope.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe our data collection and show some 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 shows our econometric approach outlining the conditional logit and latent 
class models, whereas results are shown in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of 
the results and their place in the literature. 
2. The Survey and Data Collection  
In the DCE respondents were asked to choose between different public policies that were described to 
reduce campylobacter-related mortality and morbidity risks. One concern about SP studies in general has 
been that their hypothetical nature may be perceived to be inconsequential by the respondents (Carson 
and Groves 2007). Respondents were told when invited to take part in the survey the information that they 
will provide is important for how society allocates resources, and we assume that respondents treated the 
survey as consequential. The policies differed across choice sets with respect to the size of mortality and 
morbidity risk reductions, the source of the disease being targeted (food- or water-borne), when the policy 
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would start to have an effect, and the monetary cost of the policy. To address the issue of within- and 
between-sample scope sensitivity we created a split-sample design with two sub-samples that were 
identical in all aspects with the exception of the size of the mortality risk reduction. We refer to the two 
sub-samples as sub-sample A and sub-sample B, where sub-sample A was exposed to the vector of 
smaller risk-reductions.  
2.1 Survey Structure 
Following an introductory welcome note to respondents, the survey consisted of four sections. The first 
section contained questions on respondents’ risk perception and attitudes towards food and water safety, 
personal experience of food poisoning as well as a set of questions regarding respondents’ risk behavior 
(e.g. their use of risk-reducing measures in the home environment). Section two described the illness of 
campylobacteriosis to the respondents. The annual incidence was described to be 63 000 in Sweden, 
which corresponds to a risk of 7 in 1,000 (AgriFood 2012). It was further described that 
campylobacteriosis can be categorized as mild, moderate or severe with accompanying symptoms 
described. In section two the respondents were also asked to state their health status using a visual 
analog scale. Section three contained the DCE where respondents were asked to choose between 
policies (or the status quo alternative) that differed with respect to the levels of the respective attributes. 
Following the DCE part, the fourth section included questions on socio-economics and demographics. 
After the fourth section, respondents could choose to finalize their participation in the survey, but they 
were also asked if they would consider answering a number of debriefing questions. 
In order to design the survey in a comprehensible and clear way we initially tested the survey in 
small focus groups. Following this, we performed two pilot studies on-line with 100 and 50 respondents. 
The feedback from the two pilot studies induced some minor textual changes to the description of the risk 
scenario and some modifications of attribute levels. 
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2.2 Attributes and Levels 
The choice experiment was designed with 5 attributes with a varying number of attribute levels: source of 
disease (2 levels), mortality risk reduction (3 levels), morbidity risk reduction (3 levels), delay (4 levels), 
and cost (3 levels). Table 1 below shows the attributes and their levels. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 The levels of each attribute were determined based on relevance to the research question, 
discussions and feedback from a medical expert in the field of infectious diseases, as well as feedback 
from the focus groups. The first attribute listed in Table 1 is the source of disease, i.e. food- or water-born 
campylobacteriosis. This attribute will be irrelevant to respondents if they only care about the size of the 
risk reduction. But if respondents perceive there to be different averting behavior possibilities, or consider 
the controllability or dreadfulness etc. of the risks to differ, the source of disease can affect risk 
preferences (Slovic 2000, Shogren and Crocker 1999). Here we hypothesize that perceived controllability 
of the risk is lower for water-borne campylobacter and that this may positively affect the valuation of water-
borne risk reducing policies. 
 To address our main research question we take a novel approach and design two alternative 
scenarios varying the mortality risk vector. In the first scenario (sub-sample A) the mortality risk reductions 
varied between 1, 2 and 4 fewer deaths per year. These mortality risk reductions are reasonable and 
policy-relevant given the current number of deaths due to campylobacteriosis in Sweden, which was 
reported to the respondents of sub-sample A as less than five cases among the 63 000 people becoming 
sick every year. In the second scenario (sub-sample B) the mortality risk-reductions were multiplied by a 
factor of 100 to be in line with road-fatality risk. In sub-sample B it was also explained that 63,000 people 
get sick every year, but the number of deaths due to campylobacteriosis each year was not specifically 
mentioned. It was only stated that in rare events the illness can lead to death. 3 The motivation for using 
                                                           
3
  In sub-sample A the information respondents received after being informed about the risk of illness was “In 
addition, in rare events the illness can lead to death (less than 5 cases in total per year in Sweden).”. Since this 
baseline risk is smaller than the risk reductions used in sub-sample B, and since providing another baseline level 
would have meant stating an incorrect baseline risk, the information about the number of cases was left out in sub-
sample B. Based on debriefing questions we have no indications that respondents in sub-sample B considered the 
attribute levels as less reasonable or relevant compared to respondents in sub-sample A. 
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risk reductions in line with road-fatality risk is that there is a large body of empirical evidence, not only 
internationally (Andersson and Treich 2011) but also based on Swedish data (Hultkrantz and Svensson 
2012) based on these risk levels. Hence, this provides an opportunity to compare our estimates to 
previously reported values in the literature. This meant, however, that the objective baseline mortality-risk 
could not be communicated to the respondents in sub-sample B since it is smaller than the risk reductions 
used in the choice sets. 
 By running the analysis on sub-sample A and B, respectively, we can examine within-sample scope 
sensitivity by examining the size and significance of the coefficient estimate of the mortality risk reduction 
attribute; i.e. the standard scope sensitivity test in the DCE literature. By comparing estimates between 
sub-sample A and B, we can also, conduct a test analogous to a between-sample scope sensitivity test. 
Not only does this design permit us to test for within- and between-scope sensitivity, but it also makes it 
possible to relate our estimates based on sub-sample B with the VSL literature in previous Swedish and 
other international studies (Hultkrantz and Svensson 2012, Lindhjelm et al. 2011).  
 The levels for the morbidity risk reductions were chosen as to represent sizeable effects and to be 
in balance with mortality risk reductions, i.e. neither of the attributes would obviously dominate the other. 
The levels were discussed in focus groups and established in the pilot surveys (they were initially slightly 
lower).  
 To help respondents understand the small changes in risk we took a number of different actions. 
Due to the very small mortality risk-levels we use frequencies rather than probabilities in the risk 
description in order to lessen the cognitive burden for respondents and also making it possible for 
respondents to relate the risk numbers to the total population at risk, i.e. the Swedish population (Kalman 
and Royston 1997). As discussed by Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor (2000), presenting risk in 
frequencies rather than probabilities may make it easier for respondents to show scope sensitivity. 
Moreover, for the morbidity risk we used a verbal probability analog by describing that the total number of 
illnesses correspond to 700 cases in city of 100 000 habitants (an average sized city in Sweden). Due to 
the very low baseline mortality-risk in sub-sample A, and that no explicit baseline mortality-risk was 
provided in sub-sample B, together with the mixed evidence found in the literature on visual aids’ ability to 
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solve the scope sensitivity issue (e.g. Corso, Hammitt, and Graham 2001, Haninger and Hammitt 2011, 
Goldberg and Roosen 2007), we decided to not include any visual aid. Instead, in addition to the 
measures mentioned above, after the first choice set the respondents received feedback on their choice in 
terms of what it implied in changes in costs, prevented deaths, prevented illnesses, etc. The respondent 
was then asked if he/she was satisfied with his/her choice and wanted to proceed to the next choice set, 
or to change his/her choice in the current choice set. This procedure was provided to enhance the 
understanding of the risk scenario and choice alternatives for the respondents, especially considering that 
interactive feedback on choices/decisions generally has been shown to be influential for learning and 
understanding (Hattie and Timperley 2007). 
 The attribute delay, reflecting when the beneficial effect of the policy would start to have an effect 
varied between 0, 2, 5 and 10 years. The cost of the project would be immediate for the respondent, i.e. 
the delay only concerns when the benefits will have effect. The levels for the cost attribute were 
determined partly to cover reasonable ranges for respondents’ budget set, but also to allow for a large 
range of possible estimates of VSL as well as for the value of a statistical illness (VSI) (Lindhjelm et al. 
2011), and finally adjusted based on the results from the pilot studies.   
 On the basis of all possible combinations in the full factorial design, 64 choice sets with two 
alternatives were constructed using a D-optimal design algorithm (Carlsson and Martinsson 2003). The 64 
choice sets were blocked into eight versions, and each respondent was faced with eight choice sets. The 
order of the choice sets was randomized across respondents. 
2.3 The Choice Sets 
Before the respondents were faced with the choice sets a general description of the policy scenario was 
stated as (freely translated from Swedish):  
“[A]ssume that a government authority is considering two different policies that can reduce the 
occurrence of campylobacter; a stricter food control or improved water sanitation. We are interested in 
your valuation of these policies and will now ask you to answer 8 different questions. Apart from the fact 
that the policies differ with respect to the focus on food or water-spread campylobacter, the policies also 
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differ regarding: the number of fewer deaths, the number of fewer illnesses, when the policy starts to have 
a beneficial effect and the cost of the policy. Once the policies become effective the risk reduction will last 
for 5 years, after that the risk of campylobacteriosis returns to its original level. Regardless of when risk 
reduction becomes effective the payment for the policy starts today and continues for 5 years.” 4 
 To increase realism the policies were described to have a 5-year duration. However, the risk and 
cost attributes were presented as annual changes to make them directly comparable and easier to 
interpret and understand by the respondents. Figure 1 shows an example of a choice set that was faced 
by sub-sample A, where respondents prior to answering the first choice set were reminded of the baseline 
risk. As shown, the respondents were asked to choose between two different policies (Policy A or Policy 
B) or choosing the status quo alternative, i.e. preferring to have neither of the policies implemented.    
(Today 5 people die and 63 000 people get sick every year due to Campylobacterios. We now ask you to 
state if you prefer a certain policy (or not) to reduce these risks for a given cost. What do you prefer?) 
The text in the parenthesis at the top of the figure was only presented to the respondents in the first 
choice set. The only difference in sub-sample B was that the number of deaths per year was not stated 
and risk reduction levels were multiplied by 100, everything else was identical to choice-sets in sub-
sample A. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 As reported above, after the respondent’s first choice he/she was provided feedback on the 
computer screen on the meaning of his/her choice and after this respondents had the possibility to change 
their initial choice. We found that 16.8 percent of the respondents changed their initial choice. In the 
following 7 choice sets respondents were not given the possibility to change their decisions and they could 
not click ahead before responding to the current choice set (i.e. reading ahead was not possible).    
 
                                                           
4
 In order to make sure that elicited preferences reflect the health and cost domains as stated in the choice 
experiment it was further explained to respondents that the social insurance system would compensate potential 
income losses and health care costs. We also included a “cheap talk script” in order to mitigate some of the potential 
hypothetical bias that may arise in SP studies. The payment mechanism was generic  for all policies in order to not 
have a confounding effect of different payment mechanisms on the interpretation of our results. 
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2.4 Data 
The data collection took place during the spring of 2012 and was conducted on-line using a web-panel of 
respondents (conducted by the company Scandinfo). Respondents were recruited to the web-panel by 
phone (there was no “self-recruitment” to the panel) at random among internet-enabled individuals in 
Sweden aged 18 and over. This does not necessarily mean that it constitutes a random sample of all 
Swedish citizens, but considering that Sweden has among the highest Internet penetration rates in the 
world (ITU 2012) it is a region where it may be made a strong case for using a web-based study. In total 
1 250 respondents were included, where 1 000 respondents were randomly selected into sub-sample A 
and 250 respondents were randomly selected into sub-sample B. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for sex, age, university education, employment and income for 
sub-sample A and B together with a comparison to national population statistics for Sweden (SCB 2011, 
2010). There are no statistically significant differences between sub-sample A and B for any of the 
background variables in the data. In comparison with national statistics our sample corresponds well or 
quite well with regards to sex, age, employment and income. It corresponds less well with the share of 
individuals with a university education (3 years or more); with 32-34 percent of our sample having a 
university education compared to 19 percent in the Swedish population (in the age range 18+).  
[Table 2 about here] 
 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the sample regarding risk experience, risk perception, and 
subjective knowledge of food and water poisoning. Once again we see that there are no statistically 
significant differences across sub-sample A and B. Eight and 12 percent of the sub-samples report to 
have been food poisoned during the last year, whereas (in both sub-samples) eight percent report to have 
been food poisoned due to campylobacter (ever, i.e. not only during the last year). On average, the 
respondents in both sub-samples perceive the risk of being food poisoned (during a year) to be larger 
compared both to the incidence of food poisoning reported among our respondents and to objective 
national statistics. Whereas the objective annual risk of food poisoning is in the order of 10 per 100, the 
average perceptions among the respondents are 16.73 to 17.27 per 100. This however is the arithmetic 
mean. The geometric mean, which is common to use when analyzing risk perception since it reduces the 
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effect from outliers (Viscusi and Hakes 2004, Andersson 2011, Andersson and Lundborg 2007), is 10.40 
and 9.88 for sub-sample A and B, respectively, and not statistically significantly different from the objective 
risk. Also regarding the perceptions of the individual risk of being food poisoned due to campylobacter the 
arithmetic means suggest that respondents perceive their risk to be above objective average risks; 16.35 
to 25.65 per 1 000 compared to objective risks of 7 per 1 000, but again the geometric means suggest the 
opposite, 3.85 and 4.03. Finally in Table 3 we report data on the respondents’ self-assessed health using 
a visual analog scale ranging from 0 to 100 (with 100 representing “perfect health”), with mean responses 
at 80.09 and 81.94 (levels in line with previous Swedish findings (Brooks et al. 1991, Koltowska-
Häggström et al. 2007, Andersson et al. 2013, Andersson and Lundborg 2007)). 
[Table 3 about here] 
3. Empirical model 
3.1 Baseline model 
As described in the previous section the individuals who participated in the experiment were asked to 
choose their preferred option out of a total of J=3 alternatives (two hypothetical scenarios and the status-
quo) in T=8 choice sets. In our baseline specification the utility that respondent n derives from choosing 
alternative j in choice set t is given by 
1 2 3 4
exp( ) exp( )
njt njt njt njt njt njt njt njt
U sq die delay sick delay water costβ δ β δ β β ε= + − + − + + +
  (1) 
where 1 4,...,β β  are coefficients to be estimated, sq is an alternative-specific constant for the status quo 
alternative and 
njt
ε  is a random error term which is assumed to be IID type I extreme value. Assuming 
constant exponential discounting exp( )njt njtdie delayδ−  and exp( )njt njtsick delayδ−  represent the 
discounted reductions in the risk of death and illness, respectively, where δ  is the discount rate for 
mortality and morbidity, respectively (Alberini and Šcasný 2011). The remaining attributes in the utility 
function are described in Table 1. 
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The increase in cost necessary to keep the utility of an individual unchanged following the 
introduction of a policy which lowers the probability of dying without delay is given by 
 
1
4
/
/
njt njt
njt njt
U die
U cost
β
β
∂ ∂
− = −
∂ ∂   (2) 
This is a measure of the VSL since it can be interpreted as the WTP for a reduction in risk equivalent to 
saving one life. By replacing the variable die with sick, we get the VSI, which can be interpreted as the 
WTP for a reduction in risk equivalent to preventing one case of campylobacteriosis.  
3.2 Latent class model 
The baseline specification assumes that the respondents have identical preferences for the attributes of 
the policies, which is unlikely to be the case in reality. We explore this by estimating latent-class models, 
in which the utility function is given by 
1 2 3 4exp( ) exp( )njt c c njt c njt c njt c njt c njt c njt njtU sq die delay sick delay water costβ δ β δ β β ε= + − + − + + +   (3) 
The subscript c, where 1,...,c C= , indicates the class membership of the individual respondent. The 
latent class model extends the standard logit model by allowing the preferences of respondents in 
different classes to vary, while maintaining the assumption of preference homogeneity within classes. A 
further advantage of the latent class model is that it takes the panel structure of the data into account. 
Conditional on membership in class c the probability that respondent n chooses alternative j in 
choice set t is 
 
1
exp( )
exp( )
njt c
njt c J
j njt c
V
L
V
=
= ∑   (4) 
where 
njt c
V  is the deterministic (non-random) part of the utility function (Train 2009). Following Hensher 
and Greene (2003) we specify the probability that respondent n belongs to class c as 
 
1
exp( )
exp( )
c n
nc C
c nc
Z
H
Z
γ
γ
=
′
=
′∑   (5) 
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where Zn is a vector of characteristics relating to individual n and γC is normalised to zero for identification 
purposes. In the application we set Zn=1, which implies that the class membership probabilities are 
constant across respondents.    
  Combining equations 4 and 5 the unconditional probability of respondent n’s sequence of choices 
is given by   
 
1 1 1
( ) njt
T JC y
n nc njt cc t j
P H L
= = =
= ∑ ∏ ∏   (6) 
where ynjt is 1 if respondent n chose alternative j in choice set t and 0 otherwise. In the baseline case 
where there is only one class this model reduces to the standard conditional logit model. The parameters 
in the model are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
 
1
ln
N
nn
LL P
=
= ∑   (7) 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline model results 
Table 4 presents the result of the baseline model estimated on sub-sample A and B. It can be seen that 
respondents prefer policies with lower costs and which lead to greater reductions in the probability of 
death and illness. Hence, in both sub-sample A and B the typical (weak) within-sample scope sensitivity 
test is satisfied. The insignificant status-quo constant suggests that the average respondent does not have 
a preference for or against the status-quo alternative holding the other attributes constant. 5 There are no 
qualitative differences between the sub-samples in terms of the sign and significance of the coefficients. 
[Table 4 about here] 
As explained in section 4 the coefficients in the utility function can be used to derive estimates of 
VSL and this is where the difference between the two samples becomes apparent, which can also be 
seen in Table 4. According to the model estimated on sub-sample A the VSL is SEK 4 732 million (95% 
                                                           
5
 This result holds whether we use dummy or effects coding (Bech and Gyrd-Hansen 2005). We have used dummy 
coding in the reported models. 
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CI: 3954–5509) (USD 710 million), while according to the model estimated on sub-sample B the VSL is 
SEK 70 million (95% CI 45-95) (USD 11 million). Hence, with a 100 times smaller risk reduction in sub-
sample A the VSL is about 68 times larger, which implies that the sensitivity to scope is limited. Using the 
complete combinatorial approach described in Poe, Giraud, and Loomis (2005) we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the sub-sample A VSL is 100 times larger at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level. This 
suggests that there is, at best, very weak evidence of sensitivity to scope. 6 
In contrast, the VSI estimates are identical in the two sub-samples at SEK 0.49 million (approx. 
USD 0.07 million). Hence, when changing the mortality risk reduction between the two-sub samples, we 
get large effects on estimated VSL whereas we get no effect on the VSI where there is no change in the 
risk reduction. Figure 2 plots the coefficient ratios 7 in the model estimated on subsample B against the 
corresponding coefficient ratios in the model estimated on subsample A. It can be seen that with the 
exception of mortality risk the coefficient ratios in the two models are similar.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Regarding other results we find that respondents have a preference for policies that are water 
rather than food-based, and that come into effect sooner rather than later. The estimated discount rates 
are very similar in the two subsamples, and in the order of 9-10%. Early studies to empirically estimate 
discount rates related to health varied substantially (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue 2002). 
However, many recent studies have found discount rates in line with our estimates, i.e. in the range 7-
14% (Alberini et al. 2007, Viscusi, Huber, and Bell 2008, Rheinberger 2011, Meyer 2013).8 
 
 
                                                           
6
 We carried out a further test of weak sensitivity to scope by examining if a higher proportion of respondents choose 
the alternative with the greatest mortality reduction in sub-sample B. While we do find that the average proportion is 
higher in sub-sample B (49.8% vs. 44.4%), the difference is relatively small. Moreover, we find that in 16 (27%) of the 
59 choice sets where the mortality risk attribute differs the proportion is actually higher in sub-sample A. This supports 
our conclusion that the evidence for scope sensitivity is, at best, very weak.   
7
 The coefficients have been divided by the negative of the cost coefficient to eliminate differences in scale across the 
models. The sick coefficient has been multiplied by 10,000 to have a comparable magnitude to the other coefficients. 
8
 These estimates are higher than discount rates applied by public authorities in health and safety decision making 
which typically lies in the region 1.5-3.5% (Robinson and Hammitt 2011, NICE 2011, Quinet, Baumstark, and al. 2013, 
ASEK 2014). 
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4.2 Latent class model results 
Table 5 presents the result of latent class models with 2 classes estimated on the sub-sample A and B. 9 
The latent class results suggest that there are two groups of respondents with markedly different 
preferences for the attributes in the experiment. In both the sub-sample A and B models there is a majority 
class of respondents who have a relatively high sensitivity to risk reductions, as reflected in high estimates 
of VSL and VSI. These respondents also have a negative and significant status quo constant, suggesting 
that they prefer to introduce a policy rather than maintaining the status quo, all else equal. Conversely 
there is a class of respondents who have a low sensitivity to risk reductions and a positive and significant 
status quo constant, which can be taken as evidence that they prefer to keep the status quo unless the 
benefits of the proposed policy are large.10  
  Importantly, although there are large differences between the estimated VSL and VSI of the two 
classes of respondents in each sub-sample, the estimated VSL in the “low-VSL” class in sub-sample A of 
SEK 1 186 million (95% CI: 590–1782) (USD 178 million) is an order of magnitude greater than the 
estimated VSL in the “high-VSL” class in sub-sample B of SEK 89 million (95% CI: 65-113) (USD 13 
million). This suggests that preference heterogeneity cannot explain the large difference in average VSL 
observed across the sub-samples, which strengthens our conclusion that the difference is due to 
insensitivity to scope.  
In terms of discount rates there are no big differences between the classes in sub-sample A, with 
both groups of respondents having an estimated discount rate of about 12%. The estimated discount rate 
in the “high VSL” class in sub-sample B is also about 12%, while the corresponding estimate for the “low-
VSL” class is about 19%. It should be noted that this latter estimate is imprecise; we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the estimated discount rate in the “low-VSL” class is equal to 0. 
The estimates of VSL and VSI averaged over classes using the class membership probabilities as 
weights are similar to the baseline estimates. The average VSL estimate in the model estimated on sub-
                                                           
9
 The models were estimated using the optimize Stata/Mata function and code written by the authors. Several different 
sets of starting values were used to minimise the chance of the algorithm getting trapped in a local maximum. It was 
also attempted to estimate models with more than two classes, but these models did not converge.  
10
 In sub-sample B the estimated VSL and VSI for this latter group of respondents are both insignificantly different 
from zero, suggesting that these respondents prefer to keep the status quo regardless of any reduction in risk.  
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sample A is SEK 4 636 million (95% CI: 4053–5218) (USD 695 million) compared to SEK 69 million (95% 
CI: 50–87) (USD 10 million) in subsample B. As in the baseline model the VSI estimates are virtually 
identical in the two sub-samples at SEK 0.56-0.57 million (approx. USD 0.08 million). 
[Table 5 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
5. Discussion 
This study employed a discrete choice experiment to elicit preferences for food and water safety related to 
campylobacteriosis. The major objective was to analyze within- and between-sample scope sensitivity of 
the respondents’ WTP for risk reductions. To answer the research question we constructed a DCE study 
with attributes including different levels of both mortality and morbidity risk reductions, where respondents 
were randomized to one of two sub-samples that differed (by a factor of 100) in the attribute levels of the 
mortality risk-reduction. 
The results from our baseline model within the two sub-samples are in line with expectations; 
respondents prefer the benefits of the program sooner than later, programs that reduce both the mortality 
and morbidity risk, and less costly programs. Moreover, our results suggest that respondents prefer water- 
compared with food-safety programs (everything else equal), which is in line with the hypothesis that 
water risk is less controllable than food risk, and hence, WTP is higher for the former. When extending our 
analysis with latent class models we find clear evidence of preference heterogeneity. In particular, we find 
a majority group of respondents who have a relatively high sensitivity to risk reductions, as well as a 
minority group who have a much lower sensitivity to risk reductions. There is evidence of within-sample 
scope-sensitivity (i.e. significant risk reduction coefficients with the expected sign) in both models, and the 
results thus pass the typical within-sample scope test as implemented in most DCE studies. When we 
compare the results between samples, however, we find clear evidence of insensitivity to scope. In our 
baseline logit model the estimated VSL was SEK 4 732 million (95% CI: 3954–5509) (USD 710 million) 
and SEK 70 million (95% CI 45-95) (USD 11 million) in sub-samples A and B, whereas the results in the 
latent-class model (averaged across classes) were SEK 4 636 million (95% CI: 4053–5218) (USD 695 
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million) and SEK 69 million (95% CI: 50–87) (USD 10 million) in sub-sample A and B. Hence, with a 100 
times smaller risk reduction in sub-sample A the VSL is about 67 times larger.  
In a recent meta-analysis containing 850 estimates VSL was shown to vary between USD 4 450 
and USD 197 million with a weighted mean VSL at USD 7.4 million (Lindhjelm et al. 2011). While our 
results from sub-sample A are outside of this range our sub-sample B results fall very well within the 
range of previous published estimates, and are of a similar magnitude to the reported weighted mean in 
the meta-analysis. Moreover, the estimates are in line with previous published estimates of VSL related to 
road safety in Sweden that in a recent review were shown to vary between USD 0.7 and 8.3 million with a 
mean and median equal to USD 2.9 and 2 million (Hultkrantz and Svensson 2012). This finding is of 
interest since the mortality risk level in sub-sample B was based on the risk levels for road-mortality risk in 
Sweden. 
The between-sample analysis suggests extremely limited scope sensitivity, which questions the 
validity of our estimates as reflecting respondents’ “true preferences”. Our estimates of VSI are, however, 
robust between our sub-samples which we expected since the risk reductions did not change between the 
sub-samples. Note, though, that this is not evidence that our VSI is a valid estimate of respondents’ 
preferences. If the morbidity risk reductions also had been altered between sub-samples, we may have 
experienced the same scope insensitivity as for the mortality risk. Moreover, and more importantly from a 
methodological perspective, the between-sample comparison highlights that even if a study finds within-
sample scope sensitivity, which is the typical scope test in DCE studies, this does not necessarily 
suggests that the estimated WTP is a valid measure of individual preferences. As discussed by e.g. 
Goldberg and Rosen (2007) the systematic and repeated questions respondents answer in the DCE 
approach may stimulate a desire of respondents to be “internally consistent”, i.e. respondents anchor their 
decisions on early choices and in subsequent choice sets to a larger degree state to prefer policies with 
larger risk reductions (and lower prices). This “coherent arbitrariness” creates a pattern in the data that will 
lead to a rejection of weak scope insensitivity within samples but not necessarily across samples using 
different scopes of the risk reduction (Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2003, Charness, Gneezy, and Kuhn 
2012, Fischhoff and Frederick 1998), precisely what we find in our study. 
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Our results add to the broad and extensive literature on the validity of SP studies in general, 
where much focus has been placed on the issue of scope (in)sensitivity (Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade 
1999, Kahneman and Knetsch 1992, Hausman 2012, Carson 2012). Already in the blue ribbon panel 
convened by NOAA it was stated that scope insensitivity constitutes “perhaps the most important internal 
argument against the reliability of the CV approach” (Arrow et al. 1993, p.4607). Some authors have 
argued that scope insensitivity is avoidable in well conducted SP studies and has highlighted that 
insensitivity to scope has been rejected in many studies (Carson 1997, 2012) and further that it is 
something also observed in individuals’ behavior in some real market transactions (Randall and Hoehn 
1996). Others have argued that scope insensitivity is likely to prevail in SP studies irrespective of survey 
design quality, due to concerns such as answers to a large extent reflecting “moral satisfaction” or 
expression of attitudes rather than economic WTP for the good/program or attribute (Kahneman and 
Knetsch 1992, Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade 1999). If preferences are constructed in the survey setting, 
rather than pre-existing and well-defined, as suggested by e.g. Payne et al. (2000), it is unsurprising that 
analysts find within-sample, but not between-sample, scope sensitivity. 
Irrespective of the strength of the different arguments, when it comes to the application of valuing 
mortality risk reductions, lack of near-proportional scope sensitivity (which is almost never found) 
undermines the results and implies very large variances in actual estimates of VSL. And even proponents 
of SP methods (see e.g. Carson 2012) highlight that one area of application that seems to be particularly 
prone to scope insensitivity is valuing changes in small probabilities. Findings from the psychological 
literature also highlight that individuals’ tend to not use numeric information when evaluating alternatives 
with small absolute differences and when the domain is unfamiliar, i.e. as is the case for most people 
when evaluating mortality risks (Peters et al. 2009). 
To conclude, by carrying out a between-sample test for sensitivity to scope we have shown that 
the within-sample tests commonly used in DCEs are not sufficient to test the validity of respondents’ WTP. 
In line with evidence from the CVM literature we find that the more demanding between-sample test 
suggests the existence of, at best, weak sensitivity to scope. Moreover, our findings indicate that obtaining 
estimates in line with other studies, which is often taken as evidence that the estimates are reliable, can 
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be a result of analysts using similar methodologies, based on the same or similar risk scenario, and 
conducted in the same geographical area. Thus, standard reliability tests, which examine whether the 
estimates are in line with other findings in the literature, may be misleading. The finding that DCEs are 
susceptible to issues of insensitivity to scope comparable to those documented in the CVM literature 
raises the question of which of the two SP methods is better suited to elicit individual preferences for small 
risk changes. Our study does not address this question, but it is an important area for future research 
given the relevance of non-market evaluation methods for resource allocation. 
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Tables 
Table 1 Survey description: attributes and attribute levels 
Variable name Description Attribute levels  
water  Source of disease Food = 0, Water = 1 
die Mortality reduction – individuals per year Sample A: 1, 2, 4 
Sample B: 100, 200, 400 
sick Morbidity reduction – individuals per year 8 000, 16 000, 32 000 
delay Delay in years until policy starts to have 
effect (0 =  no delay) 
0, 2, 5, 10 
cost Cost in SEK per year 500, 1 000, 2 000 
Note: USD 1 = SEK 6.6, 2012-11-12  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of background variables 
Variables Description Sub-sample A Sub-sample B Swedish 
population 
Male =1 if male 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Age Age in years 45.10 
(16.57) 
45.22 
(16.64) 
48.80 
University Education =1 if university education   3 years 0.32 0.34 0.19 
Employment =1 if currently employed (age 18>) 0.58 0.60 0.63 
Income Disposable household income in SEK  
(USD 1 = SEK 6.6, 2012-11-12) 
18 017 
(8 361) 
19 483 
(9 442) 
21 825* 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of respondents in sub-sample A: 1000, and in sub-sample B: 250. 
* 2010 median household income.  
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Table 3 Risk experience and perception: Sub-sample A and B 
Variables Description Sub-sample A Sub-sample B 
Food poisoned =1 if food poisoned last year due to any reason 0.08 0.12 
Campylobacter =1 if (ever) food poisoned due to confirmed campylobacter 0.08 0.08 
Bottled water =1 if buys bottled water when in foreign countries 0.69 0.64 
Water risk =1 if subjective good knowledge of water-borne diseases 0.15 0.13 
Food risk =1 if subjective good knowledge of food-borne diseases 0.22 0.22 
Public Risk 
perception 
Subjective beliefs regarding annual risk of food poisoning (all 
causes) (objective average risk 10/100) 
17.27/100 
(17.19/100) 
16.73/100 
(18.28/100) 
Individual Risk 
perception 
Subjective beliefs regarding individual risk of 
campylobacteriosis per year (average objective risk 7/1000). 
16.35/1000 
(81.37/1000) 
25.65/1000 
(118.30/1000) 
Health Health status as measured on a Visual Analog Scale 0-100 80.09 
(16.77) 
81.94 
(15.44) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 4 Benchmark models 
 
Sub-sample A Sub-sample B 
   
sq 0.0966 0.00754 
 (1.16) (0.04) 
   
water 0.235*** 0.237*** 
 (6.23) (3.19) 
   
sick 0.0000309*** 0.0000243*** 
 (13.43) (5.58) 
   
die 0.298*** 0.00344*** 
 (16.79) (9.84) 
   
cost -0.000566*** -0.000442*** 
 (-15.97) (-6.56) 
   
delay 0.101*** 0.0919*** 
 (12.31) (5.86) 
   
Estimated VSLa 4 732 70 
 (3 954 – 5 509) (45 – 95) 
Estimated VSIa 0.49 0.49 
 (0.40 – 0.59) (0.26 - 0.73) 
Number of respondents 1003 250 
Number of responses 8024 2000 
Log-likelihood -8120.73 -2001.55 
AIC 16253 4015 
BIC 16283 4036 
t statistics adjusted for clustering at the respondent level in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a:In SEK million. 95 % confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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Table 5 Latent class models 
 
Sub-sample A Sub-sample B  
 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 
     
sq -1.929*** 1.628*** -2.314*** 1.418*** 
 (-17.05) (7.75) (-10.43) (4.38) 
     
water 0.380*** 0.163 0.387*** -0.133 
 (6.84) (1.44) (3.54) (-0.62) 
     
sick 0.0000477*** 0.0000309*** 0.0000353*** 0.0000231* 
 (17.13) (5.01) (6.67) (1.93) 
     
die 0.396*** 0.201*** 0.00458*** 0.00127 
 (20.19) (4.11) (11.86) (1.38) 
     
cost -0.000585*** -0.00152*** -0.000463*** -0.000980*** 
 (-19.78) (-10.81) (-8.26) (-4.82) 
     
delay 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.117*** 0.191 
 (14.54) (3.20) (6.91) (1.48) 
     
Class probability 0.703*** 0.297*** 0.735*** 0.265*** 
 (46.51) (19.67) (26.22) (9.43) 
     
Estimated VSLa 6 095 1 186 89 12 
 (5 314 – 6 876) (590 – 1 782) (65 – 113) (-5 – 29) 
Estimated VSIa 0.73 0.18 0.69 0.21 
 (0.63 – 0.84) (0.10 – 0.26) (0.44 - 0.93) (-0.02 - 0.45) 
Number of respondents 1003  250  
Number of responses 8024  2000  
Log-likelihood -5860.90  -1473.88  
AIC 11748  2974  
BIC 11812  3020  
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a:In SEK million. 95 % confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Example of Choice Set in sub-sample A 
What do you prefer in this situation? 
 
I prefer 
 Policy A       
  Policy B                  
  None of the suggested policies (today’s situation remains and no additional cost for you)  
 Policy A Policy B 
Source of disease Water Food 
Number of fewer individuals who die (per 
year) when the policy is implemented 1 2 
Number of fewer individuals who get sick 
(per year) when the policy is implemented 16 000 8 000 
The policy starts to have effect this year in 10 years 
Your cost (per year) 1 000 SEK 2 000 SEK 
Note: The choice sets in sub-sample B were identical to the ones in sub-sample A with the exception that 
the levels of the attribute “fewer individuals who die” were multiplied by 100. 
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Figure 2 Plot of coefficient ratios in the two models 
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